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Introduction
I am honored to write this essay to celebrate the work of Professor
Peter Gerhart, who was a tremendously creative thinker in the legal
academy and also a valued friend.
There are many kinds of people in the teaching ranks. There are
those who restlessly seek new ideas and remain undaunted if others do
not immediately accept them. There are those who refuse to unmoor
their work from their personal moral values, even when moral
skepticism is the most popular conviction of those who are then writing
in the field. There are those who never shed awareness of their own
limitations because humanness and personal self-doubt match their
critical habits of the mind. All of these characterized Professor Gerhart.
In choosing a piece of his work for this essay, I was inexorably
drawn to one of his books, which is—to my mind—one of the crowning
achievements of his academic life. Over the last decade, he sought to
examine the role of moral theory in the foundational areas of private
law: torts, property, and contracts.1 In these remarks, I will focus on
the second of these works: Property Law and Social Morality, which
was published in 2014.
Although I have read many excellent works in my own field of
property theory, and have hazarded contributions to the field myself,
this book stands apart. Once I read it, I could not forget it. It is one of
the most simple, yet brilliant answers to this question: do property
owners have obligations to others? And, if so, on what basis is this
obligation imposed?

†

J. DuPratt White Professor of Law, Cornell University.

1.

See Peter M. Gerhart, Tort Law and Social Morality (2010);
Peter M. Gerhart, Property Law and Social Morality (2014)
[hereinafter Property Law]; Peter M. Gerhart, Contract Law
and Social Morality (2021).
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I. The Restless Search
The legal institution of private property, as known in the Western
world, is rooted in a profound conundrum. The idea of individual
property rights is protective in its very essence: it recognizes the
profound need of human beings to control physical objects, certain
intangible things, and other resources that are essential to the living of
life.2 At the same time, this bedrock idea creates a difficult problem.
Individual property rights in external, physical, finite, non-sharable
resources is a zero-sum game. If individual “A” is granted control—
“property rights”—over particular land, chattels, or other resources,
individual “B” necessarily is not. Does “A” acquire—along with her
property holdings—any obligation to reckon with the impact of her
property ownership on other individuals? Is there what I would call a
“well-nigh incontestable” ground that compels that reckoning by “A”
or other property owners?
This is, of course, at the core of all societal efforts to alter, diminish,
or destroy previously conferred property rights claimed by individuals.
Whether it is environmental controls, global-warming cutbacks,
endangered-species laws, green-space-preservation laws, historicpreservation laws, affordable-housing mandates, or baldly redistributive
efforts (through taxation or government confiscation), any change in
previously earned or conferred property entitlements is in deep
theoretical conflict with the protections for the individual that the
private property system supposedly grants. We can come up with all
kinds of rationalizations about how property owners actually come out
better after these laws and their purported losses, and in many cases
that may be true. For instance, it does property owners little good if
their prerogatives are preserved but the planet is destroyed by global
warming catastrophes. We can also point out that as members of
society, property owners necessarily owe obligations to their fellow
citizens.3 However, in the United States, where ideas about the sanctity
and primacy of private property rights are so strong—indeed, in the
view of many, constitutionally4 or morally guaranteed—the gaping
chasm between property’s protective promise and the realities of social
intervention and deprivation creates a deep unease.

2.

I have called this the “common conception” of property. See Laura S.
Underkuffler, The Idea of Property: Its Meaning and Power
39–40 (2003).

3.

See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, Eduardo M. Peñalver, Joseph William
Singer & Laura S. Underkuffler, A Statement of Progressive Property, 94
Cornell L. Rev. 743, 743–44 (2009).

4.

See U.S. Const. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived
of . . . property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.”).
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Knowledge of this situation has led to an avalanche of writing in
the past thirty years that has attempted to identify what I would call
a well-nigh incontestable source for imposing other-regarding obligations on private property owners. One effort, with which I have been
strongly identified, questions whether private property guarantees as
implemented in American law are in fact as “one-sided” (individually
protective) as is often portrayed.5 This effort spawned what is now
known as the “progressive property movement.”6 In parallel fashion,
other scholars have highlighted historical understandings of property
rights—such as eighteenth-century understandings—to demonstrate
that the idea of property as protection of the individual’s autonomous
sphere is in fact a recent creation.7 As Professor Robert Gordon wrote,
despite
a lush flowering of absolute dominion [property] talk . . . , [t]he
real building-blocks of basic eighteenth-century social and
economic institutions [envisioned] . . . property rights held and
managed collectively . . . ; property surrounded by restriction on
use and alienation; [and] property qualified and regulated for
communal or state purposes . . . . 8

Another approach has been to anchor other-regarding obligations
of property owners in constitutional text or the nature of democratic
government. These scholars have argued that the individual rights
conferred by the American Constitution, and the general principles of
5.

See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, Commodity & Propriety:
Competing Visions of Property in American Legal Thought
1776–1970, at 1 (1997); Joseph William Singer, Entitlements: The
Paradoxes of Property 3–4, 6 (2020); Underkuffler, supra note 2,
at 52.

6.

See, e.g., Rachael Walsh, Property Rights and Social Justice:
Progressive Property in Action 2–3 (2021); Timothy M. Mulvaney,
Progressive Property Moving Forward, 5 Calif. L. Rev. Cir. 349, 351–
52 (2014); Jessica L. Roberts, Progressive Genetic Ownership, 93 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 1105, 1107 (2018); Ezra Rosser, The Ambition and
Transformative Potential of Progressive Property, 101 Calif. L. Rev.
107, 109–15 (2013); Laura S. Underkuffler, A Theoretical Approach: The
Lens of Progressive Property, in Researching Property Law 11, 13
(Susan Bright & Sarah Blandy eds., 2016); Brandon M. Weiss, Progressive
Property Theory and Housing Justice Campaigns, 10 U.C. Irvine L.
Rev. 251, 253 (2019).

7.

See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 5, at 5; Robert W. Gordon, Paradoxical
Property, in Early Modern Conceptions of Property 95, 95–96
(John Brewer & Susan Staves eds., 1995); Carol M. Rose, Property as
Wealth, Property as Propriety, in Compensatory Justice: NOMOS
XXXIII, at 223, 232–36 (John W. Chapman ed., 1991); Carol M. Rose,
Public Property, Old and New, 79 Nw. U. L. Rev. 216, 219–21 (1984)
(book review).

8.

Gordon, supra note 7, at 96.
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democratic government, assume that individual citizens have the ability
to live, to exercise conferred rights, and to effectively participate in
government; and that all of those in turn require that minimal survival
needs for food, medical care, and shelter are met. As Professor Frank
Michelman famously wrote, “[s]atisfaction of basic welfare interests
[is] . . . a crucial ingredient of any serious attempt” to guarantee
individual constitutional rights and the right of political participation.9
Because the preservation of private property can stand in the way of
such welfare transfers, it is imperative—for this reason—that otherregarding obligations on property owners be imposed.10
Yet another approach has been to choose a particular value or
objective, which is plausibly but not generally associated with the idea
of property as protection, and to argue that this value—when
examined—requires, through the idea of reciprocity, that property
owners be concerned about the ownership, or lack of ownership, of
others. For instance, human flourishing11 or the development of
particular human capacities12 have been chosen as the most fundamental reasons for the creation of property systems, and the
(consequent) touchstones for examining their operation. Once we have
accepted the deep roles of such values in the operation of property
systems, it follows from the idea of reciprocity that those values and
their fruits must be afforded to all. For instance, if we believe that
human flourishing or the development of critical human capabilities are
9.

See Frank I. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy,
3 Wash. U. L.Q. 659, 678, 684 (1979).

10.

See, e.g., David Abraham, Liberty Without Equality: The Property-Rights
Connection in a “Negative Citizenship” Regime, 21 Law & Soc. Inquiry
1, 32, 47–48 (1996); Sotirios A. Barber, Welfare and the Instrumental
Constitution, 42 Am. J. Juris. 159, 177–78 (1997); Frank I. Michelman,
In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls’ Theory
of Justice, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 962, 962–64 (1973); Robin West, Rights,
Capabilities, and the Good Society, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 1901, 1903–04
(2001); Peter B. Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution:
Rethinking Our Duty to the Poor, 39 Hastings L.J. 1, 34 (1987) (arguing
that because education is fundamental to participation in democracy,
there is a right to such an education from the state); Goodwin Liu,
Interstate Inequality in Educational Opportunity, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
2044, 2045–48 (2006) (arguing that there is a “federal responsibility for
ameliorating social and economic inequality” which can be fulfilled, for
example, by the guarantee that an adequate education is available to all).

11.

See Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver, An
Introduction to Property Theory 89–90 (2012); Gregory S.
Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94
Cornell L. Rev. 745, 749 (2009) [hereinafter Social-Obligation Norm].

12.

See, e.g., C.B. Macpherson, Human Rights as Property Rights, Dissent,
1977, at 72, 77 (suggesting that property is a means to “a full and free
life” by allowing the use and development of human capabilities and
energies).
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of importance for us, “to avoid contradicting ourselves,”13 we must
recognize their importance for others. And if we believe that property
ownership is critical to achievement of those objectives, we must agree
that universal property ownership of some kind—an “other-regarding”
obligation—is a part of our constructed property system.
All of these theories are powerful. However, they are all subject to
a powerful critique. All of these theories either seek to undermine the
individually protective view of property with a different one, or claim
some outside source—the Constitution, theories of democratic government, or, implicitly, some other transcendent goal or value—is the
source of other-regarding obligations to which property owners are then
declared to be subject. Any one of these theories might be empirically
true (such as how property is now or has in fact existed), or might
correctly identify deep societal commitments that conflict with the
individually protective ideal (such as the right to life, to political participation, or to the material means for human flourishing). However, a
fundamental critique remains, and is consistently raised by the otherregarding obligations sceptic.
Of course, one can always challenge the sanctity of individually
protective property rights with alternative visions, or with unrelated
values. However, all such moves are in themselves highly contentious
ones. For instance, if we have initially conferred property rights upon
individuals because of an abstract human need for property, then these
new theories or values might well compel extending property ownership
to others. But if we have conferred property rights upon particular
individuals for other reasons—for example, because of their industry,
or because of our belief in the need for the security of ownership—these
new theories or values can be seen as simply the arbitrary imposition
of different priorities or ideas.
The bottom line is this: if the goal is to establish other-regarding
obligations for property owners on grounds that are well-nigh incontestable, these theories do not achieve it.
This kind of critique is, of course, not limited to attempts to impose
other-regarding obligations on property owners; it is the familiar and
ultimate objection to any attempt to introduce qualifications or
restrictions into the understanding of any previously recognized right.
As long as the qualification or restriction comes from a “rethinking” of
the right, or some outside value, the argument can be made that it rests
on contestable grounds and those contestable grounds are (for some
reason) of insufficiently proven validity.
This brings us to Professor Gerhart’s book. He is keenly aware of
this conventional critique of other-regarding theories of property, and
he sets out to surmount it. His task, as he assigns it to himself, is to
find a way that other-regarding obligations for property owners can be
13.

Social-Obligation Norm, supra note 11, at 769; see also Alan Gewirth,
Reason and Morality 104–05 (1978).
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convincingly demonstrated to be entailed by—to be unavoidably and
inherently a part of—the core idea and values of the private-property
regime, itself.14

II. The Gerhart Book
The task that Professor Gerhart assigns himself is extremely
demanding—indeed, it is maximally demanding. It takes as given the
existence and desirability of an individually protective private-property
regime. It therefore rejects the idea that we can impose other-regarding
obligations by rejecting the assumptions of that regime, or citing other,
competing values or sources as governing legal principles. Under this
approach, the other-regarding obligations must somehow be derived
from the idea, values, or necessary implementation of the privateproperty regime itself. They cannot simply be the result of resorting to
other external, competing (and presumably contestable) values or legal
principles.
In his book, Property Law and Social Morality, Professor Gerhart
frames the issue as an apparent conflict between property and morality:
“property”—in its ordinary meaning—seeks to protect individual
interests, and “morality”—as a limitation on property rights—does
not.15 However, it is possible, in his view, to identify a theory that
explains not only why property rights are what they are, but also how
and why they must be limited by the well-being of other individuals.16
His aspiration, therefore, is not simply to impose upon the idea of
property some unrelated theory of justice, a move which will be
inherently contestable. As he states, an approach in which “the
clashing rights, interests, or values” of others are pitted against those
of the property owner creates familiar and potentially insuperable
problems.17 Rather, his goal is to establish a property owner’s obligation
to others utilizing only the values and ideas that are already accepted
as a part of the idea of (protective) property itself. He writes that we
need a theory in which “an owner’s obligations and disabilities . . . flow
from the same source that gave rise to the [property] rights in the first
place . . . .”18
For the lawyer or philosopher, the requirements of this approach
identify the gold standard for a demonstration of this type.19 If a
14.

See Property Law, supra note 1, at 5.

15.

See id.

16.

See id. at 6.

17.

See id. at 11.

18.

Id. at 12 (emphasis added).

19.

For example, Professor Greg Alexander argues that a grounding for the
other-regarding obligations of property owners can be found in something
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particular legal principle or value is conceded to be highly desirable, on
some ground, claiming its indictment by citing competing ideas or
values is a cheap shot. It is obvious that the individually protecting
character of a private property regime will be indicted if a communitarian perspective is asserted to be superior. Simple assertion of a
communitarian view’s superiority is not, however, convincing proof that
this challenge to the individually protecting view is well-nigh
incontestable. It is, in fact, highly contestable. Only if the critique can
be shown to be entailed by—to be unavoidably and inherently a part
of—the challenged protectionist view, will it be unquestionably
convincing.
As a first step, there must be some unquestionably accepted
understanding of what property is intended to achieve for owners.
Several equally acceptable candidates come to mind, such as protection,
security, and autonomy. Indeed, these goals—when it comes to
property—are mutually reinforcing. Protection of an individual’s
property (land, money, and so on) creates physical and economic
security, which in turn allow the individual to act freely without
interference (physically or otherwise) in making life’s choices. This is
captured by the traditional image of private property as protecting “the
individual’s autonomous sphere.”20
The particular private-property objective that Professor Gerhart
chooses for focus is autonomy. Private law, including property law,
“sees each person as an autonomous actor, fully endowed with the
freedom to make decisions that do not positively interfere with the
projects and preferences of others.”21 In a sense, the selection of
autonomy as the value that property serves could be seen as an
arbitrary one. However, its selection does not violate the rules of
Gerhart’s mission. If autonomy has been accepted as an intrinsic part

other than raw (and contestable) moral principles: it can be found in our
duties to ourselves. Our obligation to support others—the communities in
which we live—“is not based on reciprocity, and is not contractarian.”
Because living in a community is necessary for our own well-being,
supporting others “is based on the obligation each of us owes to ourselves
to live well.” See Gregory S. Alexander, Property and Human
Flourishing, at xv (2018); see also id. at 52.
20.

United States Supreme Court decisions are replete with this image. See,
e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 93 (1980) (Marshall,
J., concurring) (property “establish[es] a sphere of private autonomy
which government is bound to respect.”). The pervasiveness of this image
in the way that property is imagined is recognized by scholars across the
political spectrum. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private
Property and the Power of Eminent Domain 22 (1985); Frank
Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 1626 (1988). See
generally Underkuffler, supra note 2, at 39–40.

21.

Gerhart, Property Law, supra note 1, at 121.
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of and reason for property protection, focus on that value cannot draw
complaint.
From this point, identification of a source of other-regarding
obligations of property owners flows easily. It follows inexorably from
the statement of private property and autonomy that Professor Gerhart
has just made. Autonomy guarantees the freedom to make decisions
“that do not positively interfere with the projects and preferences of
others.”22 From that simple statement, an other-regarding norm is born.
The centrality of this restriction on property owners is obvious to
Professor Gerhart, whose primary theoretical inquiries involved the law
of torts. If an individual acts, and by that action harms another, it is
universally accepted that the individual is accountable for the harm
that she has caused.23 Just as tort duties flow from actions that an
individual takes, so it is true in the world of property. Obligations to
others “flow[] from an [owner]’s activity decisions.”24 There is, he
writes, no need to import external bases or ideas about other-regarding
obligations. Other-regarding obligations of property owners arise from
the simple idea of tortious conduct, and responsibility for it.
At first blush, one wonders, how is this so revolutionary? Every
property owner is aware of common law nuisance, under which one
property owner cannot flood, pollute, and so on, the land of another.
Nuisance lies at the juncture of property and tort: in first-year law
school education, it appears in property law casebooks, and also in those
dealing with torts. If the nuisance idea is so unquestionably accepted,
and illustrates the connection between the rights of property and the
theory of torts, how is Professor Gerhart’s theory so startlingly
fundamental?
The brilliance of Professor Gerhart’s insight lies not in its reminding
us of the universal recognition of the law of nuisance; the fact that we
do not need to be reminded of those bedrock principles is central, itself,
to the theory he presents. Indeed, to meet his goal of incontestability,
the fundamental principle must—of necessity—be instantly and
universally recognizable. The power of his insight lies in his breaking
down of the “conceptual silo” that has encased nuisance law, and his
clear and unequivocal recognition of the implications of its principles.
Consider, for instance, the following example. Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council25 is now one of the most famous decisions by
the United States Supreme Court in all of the jumbled complexity and
bitter political debate surrounding federal takings law.26 The facts in
22.

See id. (emphasis added).

23.

See id. at 27.

24.

Id. at 142 (emphasis added).

25.

505 U.S. 1003 (1992).

26.

See Laura S. Underkuffler, Property and Change: The Constitutional
Conundrum, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 2015, 2024, 2027 (2013).
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Lucas were classic—absolutely ordinary—which has helped to elevate
this case to its significance. In 1977, the South Carolina Legislature
enacted the Coastal Zone Management Act.27 The Act “required owners
of coastal zone land that qualified as [an environmental] ‘critical area’
. . . to obtain a permit” from the South Carolina Coastal Council prior
to development.28 “In the late 1970s, Lucas and others began residential
development [activities] on the Isle of Palms, a barrier island” located
near the City of Charleston.29 In 1986, he purchased two lots with the
intention of erecting single-family homes on them.30 At the time of their
purchase by Lucas, the lots were not “critical areas” under the Act.31
In 1988, the South Carolina Legislature enacted another
environmental protection law, the Beachfront Management Act.32 The
purpose of this Act was to protect the beach-and-sand-dune coastal
system from unwise development which could “jeopardize[] the stability
of the beach/dune system, accelerate[] erosion, and endanger[] adjacent
property.”33 As a result of this Act, in conjunction with the former Act,
the development of Lucas’s parcels was prohibited.34
Lucas challenged this situation in court, claiming that it “effected
a taking of his property without just compensation.”35 He “did not take
issue with the validity of the [Beachfront Management] Act as a lawful
exercise of South Carolina’s police power”; he conceded that the goals
of the Legislature in passing the legislation were legitimate police power
objectives.36 A state government can act to save coastal areas from
erosion and other property endangerment. However, Lucas asserted
that the legal protection that was afforded to his property rights was

27.

See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1007 (noting the passage of the Coastal Zone
Management Act, No. 123, 1977 S.C. Acts 224).

28.

Id. at 1007–08 (citing S.C. Code Ann. § 48-39-130(A) (1976)).

29.

See id. at 1008.

30.

See id.

31.

See id.

32.

See id. (noting the passage of the Beachfront Management Act, No. 634,
1988 S.C. Acts 5120).

33.

S.C. Code Ann. § 48-39-250 (Supp. 1990).

34.

See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1008–09. The Act permitted property owners to
request relief from the development prohibition under some circumstances. Ten lot owners sought special permits to develop on land where
the Act had similarly barred development. See Vicki Been, Lucas v. The
Green Machine: Using the Takings Clause to Promote More Efficient
Regulation, in Property Stories 221, 236, 246 (Gerald Korngold &
Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2004). However, Lucas spurned that alternative
and decided “to come out with all guns blazing . . . .” Id. at 231.

35.

Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1009.

36.

See id.

295

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 72·Issue 2·2021
Do Property Owners Owe Duties to Others?

superior. If the Legislature acted in this way, it owed him compensation.37
To frame this in our current terms, Lucas did not argue that his
planned activities would not harm others. In fact, he conceded as much.
Rather, he argued that the fact of harm and legal responsibility for
harm are two different things. A property owner is not responsible for
harming others by his actions, because a property owner’s rights are
not inherently subject to other-regarding obligations.
What did the United States Supreme Court do with this case?
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, sustained Lucas’s claim. The
idea “that ‘harmful or noxious uses’ of property may be proscribed by
government regulation without . . . compensation” was flatly rejected.38
Rather, in each case the effect of the restriction on the complaining
landowner must be considered. If the impact on the property owner is
too severe, the government must compensate, “no matter how weighty
the asserted ‘public interests’ involved.”39
So—under this understanding—other-regarding obligations are not
always a part of property rights. Indeed, if the pecuniary or other effect
of other-regarding (public) interests on the owner is severe enough, the
owner must be compensated for that loss, even if his actions cause
catastrophic loss to the other.
This understanding might be seen as something aberrational, or
limited to what was then Scalia’s wing of the Court.40 However, to
minimize the widespread nature of this belief would be a mistake. The
idea that property owners are protected from loss—no matter how
strong the opposing interests—permeates American popular culture
and, often, American law. All of us have seen news stories and read
legal opinions that reek with outrage at how a landowner’s plans to fill
wetlands, excavate ponds, armor shorelines, or build on fragile
ecological areas were “unjustly” curtailed. Other-regarding obligations?
There is little mention of these. They are “pale sisters,” at best, of the
bedrock imperative that property rights deserve protection.
There is, however, one anomalous quirk in the Lucas case. Although
the Court (through Justice Scalia’s opinion) rejected the idea that
property owners must always account for the harm from their actions,
there was one exception that was articulated to this rule. That
exception exists if the owner’s actions create a common-law nuisance.
The Court majority stated—as a kind of aside—that avoiding common37.

See id.

38.

See id. at 1022, 1024–27.

39.

See id. at 1028–29 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982)).

40.

In other work, I have called this understanding a perversion of the requirements of both property rights and justice. See Laura S. Underkuffler,
Tahoe’s Requiem: The Death of the Scalian View of Property and Justice,
21 Const. Comment. 727, 730–31 (2004).
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law nuisance is always required of property owners, because it is a “part
of [the landowner’s] title.”41 It is an inherent part of all property rights
“to begin with.”42
Strangely, the Court’s majority did not really explain why otherregarding obligations are “of course” imposed by nuisance law, but not
by legislative or other harm-preventing government enactments. Most
importantly, when it comes to the kinds of harms that are prohibited,
the subject matter of nuisance law and protective legislation is largely
identical. For instance, the harms that were addressed by the legislature
in the Lucas case—i.e., erosion and other physical damage to others’
lands—are classically those that nuisance law addresses.43 There was
some murmuring in the majority’s opinion about a landowner knowing
or accepting nuisance restrictions, in contrast to legislative enactments,44 although the opinion elsewhere acknowledged that “the
property owner necessarily expects [that] the uses of his property [will]
be restricted . . . by various [newly enacted] measures” in furtherance
of police power objectives.45
There is, of course, the fact that protective powers under nuisance
law are radically (geographically) limited: proof and “causation”
requirements of common-law nuisance law limit cases, as a practical
matter, to claims against neighbors or other owners of nearby
properties.46 Perhaps, therefore, the reason for the Court’s distinction
between other-regarding obligations in the two contexts is purely
ideological: in an effort to advance an agenda of property protection,
the majority simply chose to (arbitrarily and radically) limit the permissible legal sources for other-regarding obligations.
Be that as it may, at this point we must return to Professor
Gerhart’s book. The brilliance of his book is that it does not accept the
nuisance/legislative distinction, or any distinction, in applying the idea
that the causing of harm triggers a reckoning with other-regarding
obligations.
By cutting through the noise and perceiving the true foundation for
other-regarding obligations in property law, Professor Gerhart’s book is
41.

See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027, 1029.

42.

See id.

43.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 834 cmt. b (Am. L. Inst. 1979).

44.

See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027–29 (“Any limitation so severe cannot be newly
legislated or decreed (without compensation), but must inhere in the title
itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State’s law of
property and nuisance already place upon land ownership.”).

45.

Id. at 1027.

46.

See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 834 cmt. f (Am. L. Inst. 1979)
(stating that liability for a person’s actions attaches only when it can be
shown that “his activity was a substantial factor in causing the
harm . . .”).
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a simple but masterful stroke. By building upon our foundational
intuition that harm to others requires prevention and redress—as is
unquestionably the case in all of tort law—we find that there is no
reason to deny the application of that principle to the actions of
property owners as well.
The value of any theory is whether it would have any practical
impact on how rights are perceived, and how cases are decided.
Professor Gerhart’s theory, if truly implemented and understood, would
achieve the undeniable link between property rights and duties to
others that property theorists and other commentators have long
sought. The claimed immunity of Lucas or another owner from a
reckoning with the dangers that their proposed actions pose to others
would be seen as a frivolous assertion, rather than as a bedrock and
ultimately determinative assumption in the case. Gone would be the
presumed legitimacy of claims by landowners that their property rights
are unquestionably superior when they want to fill wetlands that are
entirely within their property boundaries,47 or they want to build a
completely out-of-character building due to an obvious municipal
zoning error,48 or when they argue—as an absolute matter—that the
forced preservation of an endangered species’ habitat violates their
property rights.49
In short, we learn that the imposition of other-regarding obligations
when it comes to private property ownership does not require the introduction of a new complex or convoluted theory. It can be found in the
simple idea that one who acts, and thereby harms others, is (of course)
answerable in the law.

Conclusion
Professor Gerhart’s book does not pretend to answer all of the
when, where, and how questions that are involved in the imposition of
other-regarding liability, in tort or in property. Indeed, as I have
pointed out elsewhere, his limitation of his theory to actions of
“interference” with the property holdings of others, and excluding
actions involving “acquiring” property rights to the detriment of

47.

See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 611, 630–31 (2001);
Just v. Marinette Cnty., 201 N.W.2d 761, 766–68, 770, 772 (Wis. 1972).

48.

See, e.g., Haas v. City & County of San Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117, 1118–
19, 1121 (9th Cir. 1979).

49.

See, e.g., Southview Assocs. v. Bongartz, 980 F.2d 84, 89–90, 92 (2d Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 987 (1993); Sierra Club v. Dep’t of Forestry
& Fire Prot., 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 338, 340, 344 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); Cerritos
Gun Club v. Hall, 96 F.2d 620, 621–22 (9th Cir. 1938).
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acquisition of property by others, is—to my mind—an unnecessary and
illogical theoretical limitation.50
However, no work that has greatly advanced our understanding has
answered all questions or dealt with all projections. The fact remains
that in the area of its explicit application, the idea that actions that
cause harm to others are subject to proscription whatever the context is
a powerful indictment of those who attempt to assume that prerogatives
of property owners are the most natural, and should presumptively
reign supreme. Actions are actions; harms are harms. If an owner’s
actions will erode the land of others, or destroy the species that others
value, or contribute to irreversible climatic harm, the fact that these
actions take place on the land of the owner, or are “common law”
ownership rights, has no bearing on the question. As universally
acknowledged in nuisance law, property owners do not have immunity
when their actions demonstrably harm others. To Professor Gerhart’s
enduring insight, it’s just that simple.

50.

See Laura S. Underkuffler, A Moral Theory of Property, 2 Tex. A&M J.
Real Prop. L. 301, 308–10 (2015).
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